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Abstract 
 
In the wake of the terrorist attacks on the USA on September 11, 2001, Africa has become an important 
region within the global security architecture. The paper scrutinizes the military conflict management 
policy of the US and of the EU towards Africa during the years following 9/11. It is shown that the 
policies of the two actors have changed dramatically. It is argued that the policy of each actor can be 
explained with reference to their specific interests as well as to the institutions related to the Africa 
policy. The different policy approaches of the US and the EU can likewise be explained with reference 
to interests and institutions. It is concluded that the EU needed to deploy troops on the ground in 
Africa in order to prove its capability to do so whereas the US did not have to show such a capability 
as it is well known it is a global conflict manager. Also, it is indicated that the two actors have 
developed a common policy understanding of the link between security and development.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
It appears that September 11 ushered a new period in the outside world’s relationship to Africa. Since 
2001, Africa has become an important region within the framework of the global security architecture. 
It is a position which is very different from what characterised Africa both during the cold war as well 
as during the years form the fall of the Berlin wall and up until September 11.  
 Africa’s increasing importance within the global security architecture has led to significant 
redirections in the Africa policies of the United States and of the European Union. The analysis in the 
paper shows that even though the systemic level has changed, the military crisis management policies 
of the two actors are far from identical. It is the assumption that the different Africa policies cannot be 
explained only by reference to the transformation of the global system, it is necessary to include the 
domestic environment of both actors if we want to understand the changes in the Africa policies as well 
as the differences between the policies of the two actors. 
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It is the argument of the paper that the military crisis management policies of the US and the 
EU have to be explained with reference to two factors. First, it is argued that the interests and the 
preferences of the two actors are different if we compare the situation before September 11, 2001 and 
the situation after. Secondly, it is argued that the institutions related to the Africa policies have changed 
if we compare the situation before and after September 11. In summary, the post 2001 Africa policies 
are to be explained by referring to either shifting interests and/or to changing institutions. Thirdly, it 
follows from this if we want to explain the differences in the military crisis management policy of the 
US and the EU, it has to be done by referring to the different interests and to the different institutions 
characterising the two actors.  
 Before embarking on the analysis, the next section gives a brief presentation of the theoretical 
framework applied in the empirical analysis. The analysis is divided into three sections, first the policy 
initiatives launched after September 11 are presented. Secondly, the interests and the preferences 
involved in the Africa policies of the two actors are analysed. Thirdly, the institutions related to the 
military crisis management policy are scrutinized. Only then, it is possible to make a conclusion.  
 
The theoretical framework 
 
As the general focus of the paper is on the Africa policies of the United States and the European Union 
therefore, it is pertinent to consult previous analyses of this topic. After reviewing forty books on US 
foreign policy and Africa, Peter Schraeder concludes that basically there has only been presented one 
theoretical framework for studying this particular topic. Admitting it still needs refinement, the 
framework involves an assessment of a number of variables most notably the nature of the situation 
confronting US policymakers when dealing with Africa. These situations may either be ‘routine’, 
‘crisis’ or ‘extended crises’ each involving different combinations of institutions and decision-makers 
(Schraeder 2003: 150, 151; Schraeder 1995). The routine situations are characterised by the 
predominant role played by the different bureaucracies in Washington as decision-makers involved in 
forming the policy on Africa. Being bureaucracies, they all tend to prefer status quo and thus opt for 
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policy solutions emphasising continuity rather than radical changes (Schraeder 1995: 23ff; Schraeder 
2001). Thus, the core concepts suggested in this framework are institutions, institutional dynamics and 
interests or rather lack of interest.  
 Turning towards specific theoretical approaches for the study EU Africa policy, the picture is 
basically the same. There are not a great number of theoretical frameworks at hand. In Sven Grimm’s 
analysis of the Africa policy of the EU (Grimm 2003), it is suggested to use a theoretical framework 
which is generally applicable in foreign policy analyses of the Union and not only in analyses of its 
Africa policy. The framework takes the unique aspect of the Union’s foreign policy system into 
account which is the dual structure involving both member states as well as EU institutions and EU 
decision-makers. The outcome, i.e. the Africa policy is the result of the interrelationship between 
national and EU actors with national member states’ interest, national values on the one hand and with 
Union values, ideas and so-called institutional factors on the other influencing the policy (Grimm 2003: 
68-75). The core concepts suggested are interests, values, institutions or institutional dynamics and the 
particular role of member states in the common European policy-making.  
 On the face of it, it may be difficult to find common ground between the two theoretical 
frameworks presented. One difficulty appears to be the difference between decisions made by a unitary 
state (the US) and a non-state like the European Union. The paper escapes the discussion and proposes 
a simple theoretical framework assumed to be able to cover both actors. Two key concepts will be used 
to interpret and analyse the Africa policy of the two actors namely ‘preferences’ plus ‘institutions’ = 
‘outcomes’, i.e. the Africa policy (cf. Hix 2005: 13ff). The simple equation illustrates two basis rule of 
politics namely if preferences change, outcome will change even if institutions remain constant and 
secondly if institutions change, outcomes will change even if preferences remain constant. Thus, if it 
can be shown that the Africa policy of the two actors have changed since September 2001, it either has 
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to be explained with reference to changes in preferences or to changes in institutions or to changes in 
both variables. Moreover, if it can be shown that there are differences in the Africa policies of the two 
actors in the post 2001 period, the explanations either have to be made by reference to the differences 
in the policy preferences and/or in the institutions of the US and of the EU.  
Here, ‘preferences’ are considered identical with the interests and the objectives. However, 
preferences and interests are not fixed entities, rather they develop over time. Therefore, decisions are 
seen as the result of interaction and socialization between the actors involved in decision–making on 
Africa. In spite of the fact that interests and preference may change over time, it is assumed that a 
number of goals, priorities and values fairly constantly guide the foreign policy initiatives of the two 
actors in question. The actors involved in policy-making on Africa may both be bureaucratic and 
political actors as well as in the case of the EU, actors on national and community level.  
‘Institutions’ are both the formal and the informal rules that determine how collective decisions 
are made. They also include policy frameworks, i.e. more or less coherent policy reflections analytical 
frameworks assumed to guide the decisions of the policy-makers. Institutions are assumed to play a 
role in the processes forming interests and identities. Not only do decision-makers and states have 
interests and preferences so do the different bureaucracies involved in policy making on Africa 
(Schraeder 1995: 11-50; Hix 2005: 374-405; Ackermann, 2003: 339-47).  
 ‘Conflict management’ is a crucial concept for the analysis in the paper. There is no general 
agreement on how to define the concept. Conflict management is used interchanging with conflict 
prevention, structural prevention versus direct conflict prevention, crisis management etc which may 
have to do with the wide number of issues that are grouped under this heading (Ackermann, 2003; 
Aggestam, 2003: 12ff). If we turn towards the definition of conflict management of the two actors in 
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question, we also find a number of different understandings and definitions (USAID 2005: 5; 
Ackermann, 2003; Smith 2003 157ff, 13).  
The paper suggests the following definition: ‘Conflict management refers to activities explicitly 
geared towards addressing the causes and the consequences of likely conflict’. The focus of the paper is 
on military conflict management. This type of conflict management may be carried out by means of 
armed forces or by proxies for European or American armed forces. The definition opens for the 
possibility that a wide variety of conflicts can be included as it leaves it to the two actors to choose 
what they consider a conflict.  
 
Preferences of the US and the EU 
 
The national interest and national security interests are the core goals guiding the foreign policy actions 
of the United States. Historically, the American interests towards Africa have been marginal (Chong, 
2008: 18; Schraeder 1995: 11 ff.). During the entire cold war period and after, it was a widespread 
assumption among the bureaucracies involved in policy making on the continent that Africa was a 
European responsibility (Schraeder 1995: 11-50). This particular strategic point of view cannot be seen 
in isolation from the strong reservations towards using American armed forces in Africa which has 
characterised all American governments in this period and which very obviously also characterised 
both terms under President George W. Bush (Schraeder, 2005, 49f).  
 The European Union’s interests and preferences towards Africa are much less influenced by 
narrow security reflections than is the case with the United States. Often, it is emphasised that the 
European Union’s foreign policy is influenced by ethical and moral concerns and it is suggested that 
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this type of priorities play an important role in foreign policy-making. Concretely, they manifest 
themselves in a preference for “diplomatic rather than coercive instruments, the centrality of mediation 
in conflict resolution, the importance of long-term economic solutions to political problems, and the 
need for indigenous people to determine their own fate – all of these in contradistinction to the norms 
of superpower politics” (Hill & Wallace, 1996: 9). Moreover, concepts such as peaceful resolution of 
disputes and liberal democracy are also associated with ‘European identity’ (Hyde-Price, 2008: 108) 
and these values too are assumed to influence foreign policy-making. Summing up, the American 
interests towards Africa are to a large extent linked to national security concerns whereas, the European 
interests are much more mixed and as a minimum they include a moral concern for the economic and 
social development of the poor continent and an inclination for peaceful solutions to armed conflicts. 
 
Institutions of the US and the EU 
 
At least 5 different bureaucracies in Washington are involved in decision-making on Africa.The 
predominance of bureaucratic policy-making on Africa is explained by the fact that Africa traditionally 
has not been important to US foreign policy (Schraeder, 1995; Schraeder 2001; Rothchild and 
Emmanuel, 2005). Each of these bureaucracies has specific interests which to a large extent contribute 
to explain why the American Africa policy may appear incoherent. On the other hand, there has been a 
fairly constant tendency where the Pentagon and thereby security concerns has had the upper hand 
among the bureaucracies involved in policy making on Africa. Therefore, security interests strongly 
influenced the policy initiatives launched towards Africa both during the cold war years and after. 
However, if a crisis situation arises, it normally involves the White House and temporarily brings 
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Africa into the focus of the President which forms a second pattern of American Africa policy. A third 
pattern arises if an African crisis is widened and extended in which case not only Congress is involved 
but a number of interest and lobby groups, too (Schraeder 1995: 26ff). The latter two situations may 
lead to changes in policy preferences and thus in the policy towards the continent.  
Like the American case, a number of actors are involved in EU policy-making on Africa. 
Decisions to launch a military or civilian (ESDP) crisis management operation take the form of joint 
actions agreed at ministerial level within the General Affairs and External Relations Council. Because 
decisions of this type follow strict intergovernmental procedures, the EU member states in principle 
have a significant impact on these decisions. Not only do they participate directly in policy-making on 
Africa, the member states also have the direct responsibility for initiating and implementing EU crisis 
management operations (Gourley 2004). This particular organisation of decision-making opens for 
considerable influence for member states with strong national interests and historical ties to Africa as it 
is the case for the former colonial powers not least France and Great Britain.  
Moreover, institutional actors with their individual interests may influence decisions, too. It is 
obvious for the Council secretariat when it is about CFSP/ESDP decisions. A recent analysis shows 
that the Commission exerts considerable influence on the European African policies. It is attributed to 
“the EU institutional system (which) has provided the Commission with several unofficial channels of 
influence….(thus) the Commission appears able to exploit the gaps in the EU pillar structure in order to 
affirm its competence on security matters” (Sicurelli 2008: 231).  
Summing up, there are obvious differences between the institutions influencing the Africa 
policies of the two actors. It appears that in particular a number of Washington bureaucracies influence 
the Africa policy of the US. Only if a crisis is significant and lasts for some time, the President and 
maybe Congress get involved which may change the course of the policy. In the EU case, the most 
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significant feature is that the member states to a large extent may affect the community decisions on 
Africa.  
 
The Post 2001 Africa policies of the US and the EU 
 
The section aims at scrutinizing military conflict management initiatives launched by the US and the 
EU in the post 2001 period. The analysis is divided into two subsections. First, the policies involving 
direct foreign military deployment are looked into. Second, the policies implying ‘indirect’ military 
involvement or the ‘involvement of armed forces by proxies’ are analysed.  
  
Deployment of armed forces in conflict management 
 
Immediately after September 11, the US launched a number of regional security initiatives stressing 
that Africa is an important region in the global fight against terrorism. Pentagon established its 
‘Combined Joint Task force-Horn of Africa’ based in Djibouti with the objective to engage in 
counterterrorist activities (Lobe, 2003; Rothchild and Emmanuel, 2005). The task force consists of up 
to 2000 troops stationed in Djibouti and around the Horn of Africa with the aim to engage in direct 
combat activities. The focus of the task force is on “detecting, disrupting and ultimately defeating 
trans-national terrorist groups operating in the region and provide a forward presence in the region” 
(Ploch, 2008: 18). It is no coincidence that the programme is focussed on the countries in and around 
the Horn of Africa as they happen to be located close to the Middle East and the oil routes. However, 
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the force is also to train the region’s security forces in counter terrorism, to collect intelligence and to 
serve as advisors to peace operations. 
In 2007, a radical shift took place in the American Africa policy with the decision to establish a 
special US Africa Command, Africom. Africom is a military command responsible for all US military 
activity in Africa meaning that all African countries except Egypt are brought under a single unified 
combat command. The decision to establish this special command for Africa implied a radical shift in 
policy from giving priority to combat operations to focusing on conflict prevention. Africom is 
intended to address no less than 6 goals such as counter terrorism, securing natural resources, 
containing armed conflicts and humanitarian crises, retarding the spread of HIV/Aids, reducing 
international crime and responding to the growing Chinese influence in Africa. The new command is 
also to oversee all current counter-terrorism programs like the Horn of Africa initiative and the Trans 
Sahara Initiative (McFate, 2007; 111ff; McFate 2008: 10ff). It is important the strategic focus of the 
command implies recognition that development and security are inextricably linked and mutually 
reinforcing.  
 During the years following September 11, 2001, conflict management with military means has 
become an increasingly important component in the European Union’s policy towards Africa. The EU 
has launched no less than three military operations in the period following the attacks on New York.  
The first ESDP mission in Africa was launched in June 2003. Operation ‘Artemis’ took place in the 
North Eastern Ituri province of the DRC during the summer of 2003. The aim of the operation was to 
stabilize the security situation in the crisis-ridden Ituri province in the DRC and to improve the 
humanitarian situation in and around the main town of Bunia (Faria, 2004; Ulriksen et al 2004). 
Evaluated against the declared objective, the mission was fairly successful.  
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 During the election campaign in the DRC in the spring of 2006, maintenance of order in 
Kinshasa was recognized by the UN as a key element for the success of the electoral process. 
Therefore, the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council decided, temporarily, to support the UN mission 
(MONUC) already in the country. The EUFOR DRC was conducted within the framework of the 
ESDP and was assigned to support MONUC to stabilize the situation during the election process, 
protect civilians and protect the airport in Kinshasa. The military deployment with the operational 
headquarter provided by Germany included an advance element of almost 1,000 soldiers in and around 
Kinshasa. The EU also had available 1,200 troops on-call ‘over the horizon’ in neighbouring Gabon 
from where they were quickly deployable if necessary (Council, 2006).  
 Soon after the UN Security Council passed a resolution in September 2007 authorizing the 
deployment of a military force for one year in Eastern Chad and in the North-Eastern part of the 
Central African Republic, the EU signalled it was ready to take on the responsibility for implementing 
the military mission. After months of negotiations and discussions among the member states and the 
EU institutions, the Council of Ministers finally decided on 28 January 2008, to launch a military 
operation of up to 3,700 troops to support and to protect refugees from Darfur and internally displaced 
people from the region. Also, the mission had the objective of facilitating the delivery of humanitarian 
aid and the free movement of humanitarian personnel. Therefore, the initiative was obviously to be 
understood as an integral element in the EU’s effort to contribute to solving the crisis in Darfur 
(Interviews with officials, Council Secretariat, October 2008).  
Comparing the US and the EU initiatives involving deployment of troops on the ground, it is 
striking how willing the European Union has been use military forces in Africa whereas the US has 
been much more reluctant to do so. The idea with the ‘Horn of Africa Task Force’ is basically to carry 
out hit and run actions implying that the US troops are expected to pull out as soon as the fighting is 
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brought to an end. On the other hand, it has never been the intention for the European Union to have its 
soldiers deployed on the ground for longer periods of time. Exactly the concept that the EU forces carry 
out binding missions contains the explicit assumption that the European troops hand over the 
responsibility to the United Nations after some months as it was the case with operation Artemis, the 
2006 Congo mission and as it is the expectation with  2008 EUFOR Chad/CAR operations.  
 
Military crisis management by proxy: Training programs and the African Peace Facility 
 
Shortly after September 11, Pentagon launched a number of programmes focussing on regional security 
in Africa. The primary aim of these programmes was to build the capacity of the African armies. In line 
with this, Africom is expected to concentrate it activities on training and on assistance to 
professionalize local militaries so they can better endure stability and security on the continent. 
Washington has increased its military spending in Africa reaching around 6000 million US dollars 
during 2002-05 and the money has been channelled into assistance programs, military bases in Africa 
and in joint military activities aimed at helping African armies improving their anti-terrorism capacities 
(Chong 2008: 21). 
Among the major security assistance programme implemented by the Department of Defence is 
the ‘Trans Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership’ started under the name PSI in 2002. The programme 
is focused on the vast desert areas of West Africa. Concretely, the programme aims at controlling the 
more or less inhabited areas of Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger with the explicit objective to prevent 
the area from becoming a sanctuary for terrorist groups. After the launch of the PSI, Algeria and 
Senegal have been included in the programme. Under the programme, US and African forces have 
conducted joint exercises aimed at fighting terrorist camps, improving border control etc. Another 
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regional programme is the ‘East African Counter-Terrorism Initiative’ which includes Djibouti, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. It was launched in 2003 with an initial financial backing of no 
less than 100 million dollars over a period of 15 months. ‘That is indicative of the importance, the 
United States attributes to counterterrorism in comparison to other aims of its Africa policy’, Fernanda 
Faria argues (Faria, 2004, 24). It is considered a pilot project for the State Department and it aims at 
financing a number of smaller programmes focussing on border control in the wider East African 
region. Its stated objective is to hit whatever al-Qaida networks there might be in the region. According 
to Peter Schraeder, the regional security programmes clearly show the change in the American policy 
towards Africa in the period after September 2001 (Schraeder, 2005, 47) as they underline that security 
has come into the forefront of the American concerns towards the region.  
The new post September 2001 American policy towards Africa also manifests itself in 
programmes dealing with training and education of African armies with the explicit aim to have the 
African troops capable of engaging actively in the fight against terrorism in Africa. No less than 41 
countries have received support under the ‘International Military Educations and Training Programme’ 
where the practical training takes place in the US (Schraeder, 2005, 51). Finally, the Defence 
Department plans to expand the existing military training programmes and to broaden intelligence 
operations to cover the whole of Africa.  
Compared with the US military training programmes, the European Union has created a totally 
different military crisis management instrument fitting the description ‘military interventions by 
proxy’. It is the ‘African Peace Facility’ established in March 2004 which is an instrument aimed at 
conflict management including military conflict management. The basic idea is that African armed 
forces bring about ‘African solutions to African problems’ meaning that the Peace Facility is not 
intended to finance EU troops making conflict management. On the contrary, it is the intention that 
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African troops are to carry out conflict management operations on the continent, but financed by the 
European Union. The funding comes from the European Development Fund which is the financial 
envelope of the Cotonou Agreement, the aid and trade agreement between Africa and the EU. The 
initial 250 million Facility has been replenished several time including through additional voluntary 
contributions from the member states reaching almost 440 million Euro in 2008. By October 2008, it 
has supported the African Union’s AMIS mission in Darfur with around 305 million Euros (Council 
Secretariat 2008: 7). During this period, the EU also disbursed a significant amount of money to 
humanitarian assistance including food aid to Sudan as well as it funded political initiatives aimed at 
solving the crisis in Darfur (Factsheet 2005). 
Summing up, the US has stepped up its involvement in Africa since 2001 and the headlines are 
counter terrorism, training and assistance to African armies to improve their ability to conduct 
peacekeeping operations. The EU has chosen another instrument with the African Peace Facility which 
aims at funding African armies carrying conflict management operations.  
 
Post 2001 preferences and interests in Africa 
 
No doubt the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 changed both the American interests towards 
Africa and the strategic perceptions of the continent in general (Cohen, 2005; Schraeder, 2005; Pham, 
2005).  September 11 also lead to a radical shift in the American strategic perception of Africa as it is 
clearly stated by J.P. Pham: “It took the shock of the 9/11 attacks to shift the focus of American 
policymakers and analysts back to Africa in a concerted manner” (Pham 2007: 41). First of all, Africa 
was suddenly considered an important region where the US was to meet its new enemy, international 
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terrorism. The goal fighting terrorism was strongly emphasized in the US national ‘Security Strategy’ 
launched in September 2002 (White House, 2002, n.p.). The White House ‘National Security Strategy’, 
issued in 2006, went further identifying Africa as “a high priority of this Administration”, and 
“recognizing that our  security depends upon partnering with Africans to strengthen fragile and failing 
states and bring ungoverned areas under control of effective democracies” (White House 2006 n.p.).  
 In 2004, an advisory panel of Africa experts authorized by Congress to propose new policy 
initiatives identified five factors that have shaped American interests in Africa in the past decade: oil, 
global trade, armed conflicts, terror and HIV/AIDS. The priority given to fighting international 
terrorism has increasingly been mixed with another traditional US national security issue namely 
access to oil supplies from Africa (Klare and Volman, 2006; Schraeder, 2005, 52ff). According to 
National Intelligence Council forecasts, the US could be importing as much as 25% of its oil from 
Central Africa by 2015 compared with 16% at the beginning of the current century (Pham, 2005, 19; 
Servant, 2003). As of 2007, Africa supplied the US with roughly the same amount of crude oil as the 
Middle East (Ploch 2008: 13). In 2002, the Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Walter H. 
Kansteiner III declared “African oil is of national strategic interest to us” (Wall 2003). The question of 
access to oil has become even more important in the face of the fast growing Chinese presence in 
Africa which is strongly focussed on oil (Chong, 2008:19).  
 The European Community has had a close relationship to Africa ever since the adoption of the 
Rome Treaty in the late 1950s. During the years of the cold war, the relationship was restricted to the 
European Union delivering development assistance under the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions (Grilli, 
1994). The concern for promoting economic and social development in Africa did not stop with the 
ending of the cold war. With the increasing number of civil wars, regular inter-state wars and general 
instability appearing throughout sub-Saharan Africa during the 1990s, the European Union developed 
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an explicit interest in managing and if possible preventing such conflicts. It was stated in numerous 
public declarations (Olsen 2009: 156-159).  
The promotion of peace and stability became crucial elements of the CFSP/ESDP aimed at 
Africa. The official recognition of a close connexion between development on the one hand and peace 
and stability on the other was clearly demonstrated in the European Africa Strategy adopted in late 
2005 stating “Without peace, there can be no lasting development…. it is now universally recognised 
that there can be no sustainable development without peace and security. Peace and security are 
therefore the first essential prerequisites for sustainable development” (European Communities 2005: 
10; 26). The EU-Africa summit in Lisbon of 8-9 December 2007 made it clear that making peace and 
security is a key dimension of the new EU-Africa joint strategy describing the relationship between the 
two regions as a ‘Strategic Partnership (Africa-EU 2007). Increasingly, the socio-economic and the 
security interests have been complemented with priorities such as preventing migration, fighting drug 
trafficking and terrorism (Interviews with officials, Council Secretariat, Brussels, October 2008).  
Turning towards the African Peace Facility, it was clearly motivated by a strong desire to have 
the African Union taking responsibility for African security and thereby to avoid direct European 
military involvement on the continent (Interviews with officials, Council Secretariat 205; Howorth 
2007: 217, Biscop 2005: 133). It contributed to specifying two core concerns of the EU towards Africa. 
One is to avoid deploying European troops on the continent by offering financial contributions to 
African peace and conflict management operations. The other aim is to contribute to capacity building 
with the African partners which include a whole range of activities such as training of African troops to 
perform peace and security operations. The latter element was still being negotiated as of late 2008 
(Several interviews, Council Secretariat & Commission (DG-Trade), Brussels Oct. 2008). Also, there 
seems to have been a strong commitment to the common aim buttressing the EU’s ambition for having 
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a highly profiled conflict management policy in Africa and no doubt, the Facility was instrumental in 
this context.  
Summing up, the interests of both actors have changed quite significantly during the years 
following 2001. On the other hand, they have not merged in this period rather on the contrary. The US 
interests have been focussed narrowly on the fight against international terrorism and equally important 
on the access to oil from Africa. The actual policy initiatives launched by the EU seems to point 
towards a conclusion that the European interests and priorities have been much ‘softer’, i.e. they have 
been focussed on creating an environment favourable to development by giving priority to initiatives 
promoting peace and stability.  
 
Institutions in the post 2001 period 
 
In order to understand the US policy towards Africa, it is absolutely necessary to look at the 
interactions of the bureaucratic decision-makers. Peter Schraeder maintains that the “unique nature of 
the US policy making system ensures that specific policy initiatives often emerge from and are 
coordinated by the national security bureaucracies with little input from the white house” (Schraeder 
2006: 6). Specifically, it is argued that the Pentagon has served as the primary driving force in the 
creation and expansion of the current regional security initiatives (Schraeder 2006: 12). These 
particular policy initiatives are linked to the “strong aversion to direct US military involvement in 
either peacekeeping or peacemaking operations in Africa” (Schraeder 2006: 13). The apparent 
predominance of the Pentagon may be weakened by the establishment of the Africom as it implies the 
capabilities have to fuse of the Defence Department, State Department and USAID and other civilian 
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organizations (McFate, 2007: 117). The process is still under way but it appears that the Department of 
Defence has a desire to use the new military command as a platform to integrate overall US policy 
towards Africa (Patrick 2008: 238). 
The Africa Command clearly reflects the evolution in American policy makers’ perceptions of 
US strategic interests in Africa (McFate 2007: 114). Africom was born out of a number of security 
lessons one of which is that military force may not be the best instrument in security policy whereas 
‘soft power capacities’ aimed at preventing conflict may in many any instances be better. The 
recognition that security and development are closely linked and mutually reinforcing is part of the new 
strategic paradigm which stresses that only by the addressing the challenges of development can 
security be achieved and maintained. This interpretation may be in contradiction to the analysis made 
by Peter Schraeder in 2006 namely that “a growing militarization of US foreign policy towards Africa” 
can be observed (Schraeder 2006: 16). 
Turning towards the European Union’s institutional arrangement related to the Africa policy, 
decisions on general foreign policy initiatives as well as decisions on deployment of armed forces have 
to be taken in accordance with the principles of intergovernmentalism. Automatically, it gives the 
member states a potentially strong influence on the decisions.  Therefore, it is necessary to take a closer 
look at the role and the concerns of some of the key member states not least the UK and France. It is 
probably impossible to understand why operation Artemis was launched and why it was launched at 
that particular point in time unless we look at the role of the members states in decision-making. The 
mission in Ituri expressed a significant policy shift which reflected a change in preferences. It also 
reflected a shift in institutions as the launch of military operations is part of a fundamental policy 
change namely the explicit political priority of the EU to have an independent European defence policy 
(Tardy, 2009: 17-36).  
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One explanation to why operation Artemis was launched is the deep divisions among the 
European member states caused by the war on Iraq in the spring of 2003. The Congo operation was an 
attempt by which the European powers wanted to prove they could still cooperate and that the 
CFSP/ESDP was still alive (Salmon 2005: 375-9; Menon, 2005: 631-648; interviews, Council 
Secretariat December 2005).  Moreover, it appears that the French President Jacques Chirac in 
particular found it urgent for the EU to prove it could act autonomously from NATO (Gegout, 2005: 
347; Ulriksen et al, 2004: 512). The UK ‘go ahead’ to the ‘Artemis’ was mainly to prove that London 
was still interested in developing a European defence dimension (Gegout 2005: 438). In effect, the 
launch of Artemis was a reflection of changing preferences of a number of leading member states.  
The decision to launch the EUFOR DRC mission in 2006 involved both member states and 
Union. One type of member state concern had “to do with French-German cohesion and with the EU’s 
desire to bolster the credibility of the ESDP after the fiasco over the European constitutional treaty’s 
rejection in the referendums in France and the Netherlands. The actual situation on the ground in 
Congo is only a secondary factor” (Haine & Giegerich 2006). Another set of concerns was linked to 
France and Belgium which had strong national interests in using the EU as an instrument to take care of 
their concerns for the DRC’s stability. It appears that the UK did not want to get involved leading to 
significant pressure on Germany which basically did not want to deploy soldiers neither in the DRC nor 
in Africa in general (Interviews, Council Secretariat, October 2005).   
Despite conflicting interests and the complexity of decision-making in Brussels, it appears that 
there was a solid consensus on the need for EU to contribute to conflict prevention/conflict 
management in the DRC. The consensus covered the member states and the Commission,   
Development Ministers and Foreign Ministers and also DG Dev and DG Relex (ECDPM 2006: 11, 34-
35).  Jololyn Howorth mentions “accusations that it (i.e. Congo mission) was primarily intended to get 
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some good coverage for the EU” and it was “consciously framed as part of the EU’s comprehensive 
approach to the DRC which, taking the different missions together, do amount to a sizeable measure of 
assistance” (Howorth 2007: 239ff). In line with the explanation that points to the interests of the 
European Union intervening in the Congo crisis, it is mentioned that it was “a political testing ground 
for the EU to design forms of intervention” (SDA 2007: 9, 13, 34).  
There is general agreement among observers and EU civil servants in Brussels that France 
played a remarkably strong role in relation to the EUFOR Chad/CAR operation (Interviews, Council 
General Secretariat, Brussels, October 2008). The consent of the other member states appears to have 
to be explained by a number of factors. No doubt, there had for quite some time been a widespread 
frustration over the situation in Darfur. Chad offered an opportunity to do ‘something’ and not least to 
do it with an obvious humanitarian image, such as protecting the refugees who had fled as a result of 
the unresolved regional crisis. In short, it seems possible to argue that exactly the mission in Chad/CAR 
to a very large extent was an initiative taking care of French national interests but by means of the 
Union. Moreover, it is very likely that the strong French involvement in the EU decision-making 
processes reflects the French political priority of demonstrating that the EU is an independent 
international conflict manager, at least in Africa. In this there is clearly an identity between French and 
EU interests.  
In conclusion, there are significant differences between the institutions surrounding the Africa 
policies of the two actors in the post 2001 period. Based on the information presented here, it seems 
obvious that the Pentagon and thus defence concerns to a large extent influenced the Africa policy of 
the US in this period. However, it seems as if it was much more pronounced in the beginning of the 
period and the launch of Africom might be interpreted as an attempt to push for a more comprehensive 
American approach to Africa. The situation in the European Union is radically different. The most 
 20 
 
 
remarkable feature of the EU’s Africa policy is the strong influence of some member states which seem 
to have succeeded in transforming and/or merging their own national interests into common European 
interests. This is due to the principle of intergovernmentalism which guides decisions within the CFSP 
and the ESDP. 
 
Concluding reflections 
 
Currently, Africa is in a significantly different position within the global security architecture when 
compared to the situation prevailing prior to September 2001. To the United States, the region is 
important because of the role of the continent in the global war on terror and secondly, the region is 
significant because it is an increasingly important source of oil to the United States. To the European 
Union, Africa is important for other reasons. There is a sense of responsibility towards Africa which 
manifested itself in a generous development assistance policy pursued from the very beginning of the 
European Community in the late 1950s. During the past two decades or so, security concerns have 
increasingly supplemented the traditional European commitment to economic and social development 
of the continent. 
 The paper has scrutinized the American and the European Africa policies during the years 
following September 11. In the period, the American Africa policy has changed quite significantly 
because its preferences and interests towards the region changed quite dramatically in the wake of the 
terrorist attacks. After a number of years with a strong focus on the fight against terrorism, a new 
perception of how to prevent conflict and promote development in Africa has emerged manifesting 
itself in the launch of Africom. Apparently, this new perception of the value of ‘soft power’ has led to a 
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weakening of Pentagon within the bureaucracies involved in policy-making on Africa implying that the 
changed American Africa policy is also to be explained by changes in institutions. 
 The European Union has changed its policies towards the region during the years following 
September 11. The increasing reliance on military instruments for conflict management is the most 
conspicuous feature of this policy. It is a reflection of changing European interests towards the 
continent as well as a reflection of changes in institutions. In particular, the increasing reliance on 
deployment of European troops in conflict management operations points to the remarkable influence 
of some member states on the common CFSP and ESDP polices. Apart from solving concrete 
problems, the ESDP missions in Africa have also served the symbolic purpose of proving that the 
member states are in agreement on the need to pursue an active foreign and defence policy. 
 Most importantly, can the differences between the Africa policies of the two actors be explained 
by referring to the analytical framework applied in the paper? It is obvious that the interests and the 
preferences of the US and those of the EU are different. Because the US interests are so closely linked 
to national security, it would be expected that there has been a much greater inclination for the 
Americans to intervene militarily in Africa. However, the paper shows that the situation has been quite 
the opposite as the Europeans have been much more inclined to deploy troops. Referring to the first of 
the explanatory variables, it is possible to explain the American policy by referring to the general 
reluctance to intervene in Africa and the belief that Africa is mainly a European responsibility. 
The European readiness to deploy troops to Africa is not to be overestimated as it is obvious 
from the basic motives for establishing the African Peace Facility. Nevertheless, the European Union 
launched no less than three military missions in Africa from 2003 till 2008. It appears that these 
missions were motivated by some member states’ strong interests in having the European Union 
deploying troops in conflict management operations. There is no doubt the launch of all three missions 
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served the symbolic purpose of showing the European Union was capable of being an international 
conflict manager, at least in Africa. Formulated squarely, the Europeans needed to deploy troops in 
order to prove their capability to do so, whereas the US did not have to show such a capability as it is 
well known that it is a global conflict manager. 
It is impossible to explain the European policy towards Africa unless the institutions are 
included in the analysis. Due to intergovernmentalism, some member states exerted a conspicuously 
strong influence on the EU’s Africa policy after September 11. The same is the case for the American 
policy where the Pentagon made its influence felt very strongly in the different regional security 
programs. It is characteristic that these security programmes aimed at ‘crisis management by proxies’ 
and thereby they contributed to avoid the deployment of American troops on the ground in Africa.  
In spite of the obvious differences between the institutions, there is however one striking 
similarity between the two actors under scrutiny. Increasingly they share a more or less identical 
general policy framework or basic policy understanding of the relationship between security and 
development. Both actors have developed the understanding that there is a close link between stability 
and development in Africa. For the Americans, the new understanding still has to materialise in the 
policies implemented whereas the European policy initiatives analysed in the paper show that the 
Europeans from time to time act in accordance with the understanding. 
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